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23 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director

Subject: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 10:00 today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Comdr. David Knoll	- Navy Department
Capt. Karl Pochlmann	- Navy Department
Colonel Glyde Rich	- Air Force
Colonel William McNamee	- Army Department
	- CIA

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2. Mr. Block read an official communication from the Navy Department appointing Commander David Knoll as the Navy member of the Subcommittee effective 1 April 1948, replacing Captain Pochlmann.

3. Colonel Glyde Rich stated that things were moving "pretty fast" in his shop and because of the sensitiveness of the international situation Air is going to recommend that the National Security Information Agency be set up immediately under the National Security Council.

4. Colonel Rich stated that Brent, the Air Force representative of NSC 4, said that General Wright of the Central Intelligence Agency stated "we should be done away with." Colonel Rich added informally that he presumed that General Wright had in mind someone else doing this job "maybe CIA."

5. The subject of discussion was "Field Organization of the proposed National Security Information Agency." After Mr. Block called the signal Captain Pochlmann ran away with the ball and his barangs consumed the best part of two hours. Occasionally the Subcommittee members injected themselves into this Block-Pochlmann dialogue to find out exactly what Captain Pochlmann had in mind. The closest we could get to his type of thinking was that he was quite clear as to what armed services could do in the field of psychological warfare and he wanted to find out the part that would be played by the Department of State.

6. Mr. Block then read parts 1 and 2 of the report of Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean. He felt that we should learn by the experiences in this and other theaters of operations.

OSD &amp; DOS review(s) completed.

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23 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director

Subject: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 1100 Monday, 22 March 1948, in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Dept. Karl Peilmann	- Navy Department
Comdr. David Knoll	- Navy Department
Col. Clyde Rich	- Air Force (represented by a Major)
Col. William Wallace	- Army Department
	CIA

2. Since official circumstances prevented my attendance at the meeting last Friday, 19 March 1948, the Subcommittee forwarded to me the document which had been agreed upon at that meeting and which was going to be presented to SANACC. After examination of this proposed presentation I got in touch with Mr. Block to discuss with him certain observations. I felt the points were well taken and hence he decided to call a special meeting of the Subcommittee for Monday, 22 March 1948, to decide on what changes should be incorporated in the presentation.

3. Regardless of what might happen to the Subcommittee's proposed skeleton organization when it is received by SANACC I felt that any substantial questions should be clarified before the document leaves the Subcommittee. Accordingly, in the interest of CIA, I objected to the first chart of the presentation which showed the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Information Agency each reporting to the National Security Council. I observed that it was no part of the function of this Subcommittee to analyze the organization of the CIA. Furthermore, the chart conveyed a very erroneous picture since it showed CIA and NSIA on a par whereas CIA under law actually does report to the National Security Council whereas the National Security Information Agency does not so report. One is actual and the other is suggested. The Subcommittee unanimously agreed to take the Central Intelligence Agency out of the chart.

4. Under each of the sections of the proposed organization were listed estimated personnel requirements for "officials" and "clerical staff." I suggested that the organizational proposal should have sufficient flexibility to operate on a large or small scale and since these figures were immediately

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
challengeable and could present a most distorted picture I recommended that they be dropped. The Subcommittee agreed to drop all of the figures at this stage.

5. The charts and explanatory notes did not present a logical sequence of thought. After a short discussion it was agreed to change the presentation, putting the major chart of the skeleton organization as a climax at the end.

6. The presentation included a "Staff Council" on the same level as the Deputy Directors for Plans and Operations, Intelligence and Services. The Subcommittee agreed with the suggestion that the Staff Council block should be moved to another part of the chart reporting to the Director and not be included in the direct line of command.

7. Under the intelligence presentation it looked like the Central Intelligence Agency was an integral part of the proposed National Security Information Agency and that the Deputy for Intelligence was under CIA. The chart was revamped to eliminate such an erroneous impression.

8. The meeting adjourned at 1:20.



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